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This article explores the role of legality in conceptions of state and society among 
bureaucrats in the Taipei, Taiwan city government. When administrators see 
Taiwan in the global arena, the existence of law provides an emblem of modernity 
and the ability to participate in the international system. In interactions among 
administrators, law is laden with impossible ideals and fraught with assumptions 
of hypocrisy. In dealings with people outside the government, legality often 
signals the breakdown of other, more valuable, social norms. Far from 
legitimating administrative action, legality itself is legitimated by reference to the 
same values as other social action: held up to an ideal of consensus and cultural 
coherence and judged by its ability to fulfill obligations and nurture relationships. 
Law does not hegemonically structure administrators' conceptions of state and 
society. It defines one aspect of governance at the margins of legitimacy, 





1. THE DIFFERENTIATED ROLE OF LAW IN ADMINISTRATION 
 As a postcolonial, post-dictatorial, recently democratized country, Taiwan 
presents a best-case scenario of regime change.i The role of the newly 
representative state in this society thus has much to teach us about the cultural 
specificity of democracy, even in the relative absence of the military, social, 
ethnic, and economic upheavals that often accompany democratic transition. The 
state democratized both through low-level voting from below and through 
executive fiat from above. It did so with relatively little violence or social 
upheaval (Rigger 1999; Kuo 2000; Chao and Meyers 1998; Chang et al. 1997). 
And it did so quickly, with freedom of speech, association, movement, and 
political party formation taking root quickly with the end of forty years of martial 
law in 1986-87. Within ten years (1996), the country had had its first multiparty 
presidential election; within four more (2000), it witnessed a peaceful handover of 
presidential power from the ruling party (the KMT) to the opposition (the DPP).ii  
 While tensions among local ethnicities continue to provide fodder for 
political rhetoric, they have been greatly eased through decades of intermarriage 
and school and workplace integration. Even at their height, they did not reach the 
level of social division and violence experienced in many other post-colonial and 
post-dictatorial societies (Rigger 2006, 2000; Chang 1994; Wong 2001; Johnson 
1992; Corcuff 2002, 2000).iii Finally, while racing through stages of economic 
development, the country avoided the economic polarization that often 
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accompanies rapid growth, fostering a large middle class and a generally broad 
wealth distribution (Tien 1989; Ho 1987; Gold 1986).  
 Studies of Taiwan tend to show a strong state with a weak legal system. 
While state policies have been central to Taiwan's remarkable prosperity in the 
post-War period (Amsden 1985), the power of the law in everyday life has been 
shown to be "marginalized" (Winn 1994; Martin 2007). The process by which the 
Taiwanese state took on its contemporary form gives some indication of how this 
disequilibrium between state and legal power emerged (Bosco 1992; Winckler 
1981, 1984). Like most successful political developments, that process drew on 
the terminology of existing cultural norms and understandings to fit into existing 
social continuities (cf. Duara 1988), while creating powerful new trends of its 
own (Wu 1987).  
 This article builds on these lines of research to examine the role of law in 
the work of government administrators. I situate my inquiry within the 
administrative bureaucracy itself. This is a relatively unusual place for 
ethnographic inquiry, which tends to focus more on the people controlled, 
described, or excluded by state processes than on the people implementing them. 
But taking seriously those outside of, marginalized by, or victimized by 
bureaucracy should not mean taking less seriously those working inside it. In 
valorizing everyday life, social scientific research has sometimes proceeded as 
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though everyday life occurred only at the margins of power, not in its centers (cf. 
Valverde 2003).  
 Michel Foucault's evocative phrasing captures this suspicion of focusing 
on the sovereign center: the study of legality and legitimacy developed, in his 
terms, as the study of the rights of the King (Foucault 1980).iv But rather than 
abandoning the state, I focus on its own capillary dimensions. Placing my inquiry 
within the bureaucracy also, I believe, helps me avoid conflating the state, as a 
social organization, with its laws, which are after all only one way the state 
expresses itself. To illuminate its other modes of expression, I focus on the 
everyday life of the state itself: as ethnography, my study relies primarily on the 
unremarked-upon actions and words of the administrators with whom I worked.  
 I draw my material from my dissertation research, an ethnographic study 
that moved between the Taipei City Government's Department of Urban 
Development and a small, politically active Taipei neighborhood (Bernstein 
2007). For the administrative part of my research, I spent three months reviewing 
documents and holding formal interviews and informal conversations with 
administrators at the Department of Urban Development's small outpost office 
devoted to urban renewal. The outpost office then housed approximately five 
administrators, in contrast to the roughly hundred and fifty working the central 
City Government office.  I then spent approximately six months working, 
mostly as a full-time volunteer, in the department's central office in Taipei City 
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Hall. I was already familiar with many of the administrators I encountered from 
my previous year of work with neighborhood activists. As the department's 
English language consultant, I was assigned to a departmental section that 
employed around fifteen to twenty administrators (the numbers changed due to 
normal turnover and because of a departmental reorganization that occurred in the 
middle of my fieldwork). Officially housed in this administrative location, I 
worked with administrators; sat in on their daily meetings with other government 
employees, consultants, and members of the public; and traveled with them for 
on-site inspections, long lunch outings, meetings, weekend hikes, and other 
activities outside the office.  
 In this context I recorded roughly thirty hours of open-ended, semi-
structured interviews with administrators at every level of the departmental 
organization, from department head to low-level functionary, with a focus on the 
planning and implementation sections of the department. In addition to recorded 
interviews, I conducted hundreds of conversations with administrators from 
across the department, as well as many in other city government departments. 
Like many anthropologists, I find that the most meaningful parts of my material 
do not come from interview sessions, set apart as they were from normal life by 
time, place, and the presence of the microphone. The ethnographic method of 
participant observation asks the researcher to spend time living with and like the 
people she studies, noting the often unnoted patterns of their lives. Accordingly, 
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my primary material came not from the stories people told when asked to tell 
stories, but from the off-hand remarks, the unreflective answers, and the 
commentaries on ongoing events that characterize the Department of Urban 
Development's lively and voluble social life. My coworkers, moreover, graciously 
took my presence in stride, allowing me to accompany them as they went about 
their tasks and pausing in their work to discuss what they were doing.v  
 I find that how administrators use, invoke, and present the law depends a 
great deal on their implied addressees. When they place Taiwan in the 
international context, administrators often present the legalization of everyday life 
as a symbol of the country's neglected ability to participate in the world system of 
nation-states. In intra-agency interactions, however, law is often presented as 
seeking an unattainable perfection; this perfect law's very implausibility 
encourages administrators either to ignore or to manipulate it. While at the level 
of global addressees law signals ripeness for participation in the world, at the 
level of administrative addressees it bears a faint stench of ethical rot. Far from 
legitimating administrative action to other administrators, the use of law must 
itself be justified by recourse to other values, whether the political goals of the 
moment or lasting social orientations. Finally, in the context of administrators' 
interactions with those outside the government bureaucracy, conceptions of 
legality often fix the extreme boundaries of allowable action. At this level, 
legality is invoked as providing lines beyond which one can not go. More to the 
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point, one ought not to reach them in the first place. For government 
administrators, recourse to the law marks not only the breakdown of social 
process but also the failure of their administrative role.  
 Perhaps most importantly, much administrative practice hardly brings up 
the law at all. Administrators do, of course, work within the broad parameters of 
state regulations. But they tend to present the state they work for as a social actor, 
similar in fundamental ways to those with whom it interacts: subject to the same 
ethical imperatives and judged by the same standards as community groups, 
occupational organizations, and individuals. To its implementers, then, state 
action in Taiwan is legitimated when it fits into broader social ideals that have 
little to do with legality. Recourse to the law does not lend legitimacy; rather, it 
itself requires legitimation, suggesting as it does the breakdown of proper and 
desirable social functioning.  
 From one perspective, this may look like a lamentable 'gap' between law 
in action and law on the books, or between what the law promises and what it 
delivers. A gap-focused evaluation suggests a presupposed ideal of congruence 
between law as text and law as social actor, although as Stewart Macaulay 
(2005:390) has pointed out, few people would be interested in fully achieving that 
ideal.vi The people I worked with in Taiwan did not, for the most part, share this 
ethical ideal. Rather, they treated the law as only one of the languages spoken by 
the state, and assumed that it would play different roles in different arena. Thus 
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the roles law plays for administrators at the different levels of addresseeship I 
discuss are more productively approached as social facts that arise from, and 
make sense in the context of, Taiwan's political history and its broadly held social 
values.  
 Another basis for judging the promise of the law against its product is the 
hegemonic role often attributed to law or its conceptualizations. As Susan Silbey 
(2005:332) writes, "law is powerful, and it rules everyday life because its 
constructions are uncontroversial and have become normalized and habitual." But 
the differentiated roles of law I describe also suggest that the legality's power to 
permeate a society, legitimate action within it, or present a background condition 
within which people imagine their own possibilities, remain questions for 
empirical research more than characteristics of law itself. My study agrees with 
those who suggest that understanding sociopolitical processes like legality 
requires attention to the different roles that law plays in the culture of different 
places, and to the nuances of how even similar concepts become differently 
embedded and meaningful in different societies (Sahlins 1999; Jacobs 2007; 
Feldman 2000).  
 
2. ADMINISTRATION AS A LOCATION FOR ETHNOGRAPHY  
 Administrative bureaucracy has been an object of both fascination and 
derision for social scholars. Often ignored, often disparaged (Herzfeld 1992), it 
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has also been acknowledged to be central to the modern governance of state and 
of self (Albrow 1970). From Weber’s (1978) description of the role of 
bureaucracies in perpetuating a system of rule through time to Foucault’s vision 
of the administrative “conduct of conduct” (Burchell et al. 1991:2) expanding 
outward into ever more areas of life, rational administration as organizational 
form and as organizing principle has been seen as one of the defining 
characteristics of modern governance. Recent interest has particularly focused on 
how institutional recognition and categorization influences individual self-
conception and social structure. Scholars have shown, for instance, how 
administrative categories and exhortations not only affect, but also help effect, the 
very types of people designated to fill them (Foucault 1977; 1991). As Ian 
Hacking  (1991) explains, the categories of administration are not simply 
prescription masked as description; they provide descriptions particularly 
available for self-descriptive purposes. 
 Much of the most illuminating work on administrative functioning has 
focused on the vector of power going from bureaucratic administration to 
surrounding populations, looking at the bureaucracy's power to categorize the 
people it administers (Cohn 1987), to speak to and for them (Errington 1995), and 
to enact or encourage violence upon them (Hansen 2001). Studies of the 
“feedback effect” of social knowledge (Hacking 1990:2) have revealed how 
knowledge about subjects can create, redefine, or close off participation in social 
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categories (Brubaker 1996; Cohn 1987; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Gladney 
1993; Hacking 1999). The attention of such studies has generally been weighted 
toward completed forms of category transformation or institutional address. Less 
has focused on administrators as populations of their own (though see Blau 1963; 
Hull 2003; Espeland 1998). 
 This may be because for many observers, administration seems to obviate 
individual agency. The humanness of the human condition seems to get lost in the 
forms, the routines, the shuffling of papers. For Hannah Arendt—the most 
compelling thinker to present both this view and reasons to reject it—bureaucratic 
administration is the very negation of political action. Action for Arendt (1959:25) 
is a term of art closely associated with politics itself. Enacted largely in speech 
and concerned with persuasion rather than force, action fundamentally involves 
direct interaction with others and is thus conditioned on “plurality” (9): the fact of 
living with others and their multiple perspectives. We act when we distinguish 
ourselves from others and have lasting, though never predictable, effects on 
others’ lives and memories. Politics, for Arendt, involves making decisions and 
taking responsibility for their always unpredictable effects. The problems of 
modern governance arise when people cease to act and fall into the habit of going 
through the motions or going with the flow.  
 The human ability to stand out and perform then becomes dissipated into 
“a kind of no-man rule” instantiated in “bureaucracy” (Arendt 1959:37), where 
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people are normalized and judged by their status rather than their deeds (cf. 
Foucault 1977). Between the euphemisms and the collectivities and the division 
of decision-making labor, nobody is left to take responsibility or admit 
unpredictability. The bureaucratization of the public realm as a whole, for Arendt, 
makes real political action increasingly impossible: it marks, in Bonnie Honig’s 
(1993:116) words, a “lack of politics” because it precludes human creativity and 
real action. Given that view, it would make sense that action, individuality, 
powerful human relationships, would all be least possible in the belly of the 
administrative beast. Bureaucracy for Arendt, writes Hanna Pitkin (1998:79), 
instantiates the “abdication of human initiative and judgment” that plagues 
modern society.vii  
 But as Pitkin (1998:180) also notes, behavior and action (in Arendt’s 
sense) do not necessarily correspond to different arenas of life (even though 
Arendt herself sometimes treats them this way). Rather than isolating arenas or 
spheres of life, these notions can describe ways of living: not a set of activities or 
concerns but the way one engages in some activity or has some concern.viii 
Administration, in other words, does not have to act as the conceptual 
counterweight to political action or everyday life. If people behave like 
automatons or like tyrants, this second view suggests, they do so less because of 
the job they hold than because of the way they hold it. And indeed, actual 
bureaucrats in actual bureaucracies, just like people in all sorts of other settings, 
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are constantly making decisions, interacting with others, exceeding their own 
control. 
 Focusing on bureaucrats entails asking how people who bear delegated 
responsibility for the polity frame and enact their own (and others') participation 
in it. Like all government administrators, the people I deal with here occupy a 
complex position in the representational structure of the state. They create and 
help implement plans and regulations, but they are also objects of—that is, subject 
to—those plans and regulations. The low-level bureaucrats I worked with, who 
constantly interact with 'the public (minzhong 民眾),' bear the burden of 
multilateral representation: they speak for the organizations of the state to its 
people, and the organizations of the people to their state. Moreover, research in 
my two contrasting fieldsites revealed that much more united the administrators 
with the community activists I knew than distinguished them. The two groups had 
different socioeconomic and educational backgrounds and occupied different 
positions in the sociopolitical world. But administrators’ understandings of what 
constituted legitimacy in political action and organization, as well as their 
conceptions of the right and the good more generally, resonated with those of 
community activists who occasionally opposed them over specific projects. Given 
the complex quality of their role within the state, government administrators 
should be particularly interesting to ethnographic inquiry about how widespread 
understandings of political action and habits of political practice help structure the 
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realm of cooperating and competing institutions that includes, but is not limited 
to, the state. 
 
3. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE TAIWANESE POLITY 
 Law and administration in Taiwan, perhaps even more than in most other 
places, developed largely as a palimpsest of incoming influences. The Qing 
dynasty, which took over Taiwan in 1683, first ruled it loosely as “reluctant 
colonizers," unwilling to take on the costs of “pacifying” or extending control 
over the island (Eskildsen 2005:286) and willing to tolerate an ambiguous 
sovereignty in the frontier areas holding both Chinese migrants and indigenous 
inhabitants. In the late 19th century the Qing began devoting more resources to 
administering, securing, and modernizing Taiwan, but this increasing 
administrative incorporation was brought up short in 1895 by China's surrender of 
the island to Japan after the Sino-Japanese War. 
 As Japan’s first full-fledged colony, Taiwan received a great deal of legal 
and administrative attention. One of the first projects of the incoming government 
was a series of methodical studies of local customs, economic circumstances, and 
land relations. These studies helped support a strong, intricately organized rule 
that coopted local social forms and translated Japanese laws into Taiwanese 
terms, lending a sense of stability and continuity to a changing situation (Chang 
and Myers 1963; Myers and Peattie 1984; Ho 1968, 1971, 1978; Wang 2000; Ka 
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1995; Ts'ai 2006). For instance, the Japanese colonial administration introduced 
the legal recognition of private property to Taiwan by adapting the private 
property portions of the Japanese Civil Code (itself based on the French Civil 
Code and promulgated only several years earlier) to land-use terminology already 
in use on Taiwan (Lee 2004:155). Similarly, the colonial legal regime retained the 
family farm as its primary economic unit even as it fundamentally altered the 
economic world in which that unit functioned by constraining farmers' choice of 
crops and restricting their sale (Ka 1995).  
 When it acquired Taiwan in 1945, the KMT inherited the administrative 
structure left by the Japanese colonial government; it also received training and 
advice from the Japanese after the war (Phillips 2003). The Party itself came with 
policy training from Germany and the Soviet Union (Kirby 1984; Taylor 2000), 
as well as considerable experience with policy experiments on the mainland 
(Kirby 1990; Bishai 1991; Ho 1978). During the first two decades of Nationalist 
rule the United States also contributed considerable financial and planning 
support, sometimes to the extent of drafting and holding effective veto power over 
economic policies (Gold 1986; Cumings 1984). More recently, the U.S. legal 
system has exerted influence through returning students and its generally 
hegemonic position in the Taiwanese international imaginary, leading to an 
increasing mixing of Continental and Anglo-American legal forms (Kennedy and 
Shen 2005; Yeh 2002; Hwang 1995).  
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 Jane Winn (1994:195) has suggested that this history of importing legal 
forms helped marginalized the law in Taiwan: the "formalism of Taiwan’s 
transplanted version of the Western legal tradition seems to limit the law’s 
flexibility in adapting to contemporary Taiwanese social practices." Instead of 
having recourse to predictable, objective legal standards, individuals remained 
dependent on particularistic "relational practices." Many of my interlocutors in the 
bureaucratic administration shared this view. For instance, Mr. Zheng,ix a highly 
educated and well-respected mid-level administrator, once explained that western 
laws grew organically out of social norms, leading to a natural connection 
between the legal system and social realities. Taiwan's laws, on the other hand, 
were imported from America ("we like most to copy you, because that’s what we 
know best”) or from Japan ("they originally copied from Europe, so because 
we’re so close we copied from them").x This, Mr. Zheng concluded, left a big 
"gap" (he used the English word) between Taiwan’s laws and its society.  
 KMT regime consolidation likely also played a part in marginalizing 
legality. Over decades of martial law rule with low-level elections, the KMT 
developed what Wu Nai-teh (1987) has called a “regime patronage system.” That 
is, the regime itself was a patron in a clientelist system. The central government, 
coterminous with the KMT party, transferred material goods and resources to 
local elites, whose factions acted as clients of the central state.xi Local elites in 
turn became patrons at the local level, transferring resources to local clients who 
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lent them political support. Intra-party factions at the local level also allowed the 
KMT to make claims to democracy despite the actual one-party system it 
enforced (Bosco 1992;  cf. Winckler 1981). The Party could continue local level 
elections with the assurance that its monopoly over resources at the central level 
would prevent outsiders from winning seats and allow Party elites to determine 
the outcomes of contested elections by playing local factions off against one 
another. (Rigger 1999 explains how this system eroded in the electoral arena). By 
routing political action through personalistic relations and small-scale local 
organization, the clientelist system lessened “the possibility for structural or 
policy change” (Wu 1987:22). 
 Wu (1987) stresses that the martial law patronage system, which utilized 
traditional norms and forms, was not itself a continuation or a holdover of a 
traditional governing system. Political factions built on other, less formalized, 
social groups, like kin, fictive kin, and student organizations, and used the 
common ethical terminology of affective links and long-term relations of mutual 
aid and mutual obligation to render the personal indistinguishable from the 
political. The linguistic and conceptual terminology of traditional values helped 
naturalize this new political system, which itself was a modern phenomenon: 
centralized, bureaucratized, and instituted to consolidate Party control over the 
polity at different levels of social organization. Since that time, Taiwan's political 
system and the ways in which people can participate in or effect it have changed 
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radically. But this bureaucratically entrenched form of clientelism has not 
disappeared with the transition to democratization. While it has become less clear 
who acts as client and who as patron in any given interaction, my research 
confirms that the personalistic mode of governance still plays an important role in 
Taiwanese political values and ideals. 
 
4. TAIPEI IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: INTERNATIONAL ADDRESSEES 
 Taiwan's chronic standoff with The People's Republic of China informs 
the daily activities of Taipei's administrators. The country's de facto but not de 
jure sovereignty remains an issue constantly brought to the fore by external 
circumstances, such as China's occasional threats and the periodic refusals of 
noneconomic international organizations to recognize Taiwan's participation in 
the international arena.xii Taipei, Taiwan's capital, acts as the nation's model city, 
most visible to and most in contact with the rest of the world. For those charged 
with effecting it, the urban planning of Taipei was integrally involved with the 
international status of Taiwan. Administrative discussions presented the way that 
members of the international community perceived Taipei as intimately linked to 
the way that they would characterize the relation between Taiwan and the 
mainland. Perceptions of that relationship, in turn, were seen to indicate opinions 
about the place of Taiwan within the nation-state system. Administrators typically 
placed Taipei within a particular nexus of cultural influence and economic 
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interaction: Japan (typified by Tokyo), China (typified by Shanghai), and the U.S. 
(typically spoken of as a whole). Questions of self-presentation to the 
international community permeated the planning of everything from riverside 
hiking paths to neighborhood renewal. Meetings about a particular building or 
urban area routinely started off with discussions of global economic trends 
affecting the Tokyo-Shanghai-U.S. nexus. Plan proposals stressed how 
implementation would demonstrate Taiwan's cultural specificity, economic 
viability, or administrative modernity to the broader world.  
 "We start from a global perspective," an administrator remarked at a 
meeting where representatives from several city and county governments 
discussed a proposed regional cooperation zone encompassing northern Taiwan. 
"[We start] from the global, to Asia, to Taipei, Tokyo, [and] Shanghai, to 
understand what role the northern Taiwan region should play." The regional 
cooperation initiative was a nascent project aimed at overcoming the barriers to 
effective administration raised by democratic elections, which had for the first 
time allowed the region's city and county governments to be governed by mayors 
from different parties. Intense competition at the level of the national parties 
inhibited infrastructural and environmental cooperation among these 
geographically and economically connected areas. Searching for starting points 
for regional integration, administrators remained vocally aware of the 
international situation of their plans.  
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 Like their colleagues throughout the Department, these administrators 
placed the northern Taiwan region they were trying to create firmly within an 
international context. The creation of political and infrastructural connections 
presented not only a practical domestic concern but acted as a symbol of 
Taiwanese cultural and social coherence. In the dramatic phrasing of one of the 
department's consultants, administrators were attempting to construct the city's 
and the regions "self (ziwo 自我)." Echoing the laments of many administrators, 
this consultant began a planning proposal presentation by explaining that "from 
the [central] government of the Republic of China down to the Taipei city 
government, nobody knows what the self is.” He referred, of course, not to a 
psychological entity but to a territorial identity. Governmental agencies at all 
levels in Taiwan, he implied, had failed to come up with a concise, coherent 
formulation of identity in terms of which their projects could be justified and their 
realities explained and assessed.  
 Mr. Wei, a high-level administrator, agreed when he summed up what was 
wrong with his city. “We have no consensus," he declared. "We can’t even have a 
discussion about how Taipei should be." Describing the problems of determining 
the formal status of cities within a country not formally recognized as a nation-
state, he continued: "Is Taipei a capital city? Of course it’s a capital city. Do you 
dare say it’s a capital city? You don’t dare." Moving from the clearly political to 
the culturally symbolic, he went on: "Even deciding if mountainside buildings 
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should have sloped roofs, even [on] that we can’t get consensus." Sloped roofs, of 
course, are a standard feature of traditional Chinese architecture, and part of the 
lacking consensus is on the relevance of China and Chineseness for Taiwan. 
"We’ve argued about it for years.”xiii For Mr. Wei, regulation provided a means to 
achieve a unified presentation of the city’s character, boosting its international 
status and visibility. 
 As I suggest above, defining Taipei's self was important to administrators 
largely because of the importance of cultural self-definition in international 
understandings of national self-determination. Administrators, like other 
politically aware people in Taiwan, understood that the “institutional repertoire” 
of international opinion (in Horng-luen Wang's 2004:788 words) requires a 
distinct culture for every nation. That is, administrators knew that convincing 
claims to cultural uniqueness and historical specificity can carry more weight in 
international understandings of sovereignty than the manifest existence of a 
separately functioning state or economic system. Wang (2004:812) described the 
unsettled nature of Taiwan's political and cultural institutions by noting their 
common failure to "perform the social magic in front of outsiders to signify ‘who 
they are’ in an affirmative manner.” In this context, legality becomes a cultural 
characteristic that helps administrators perform this "rite of institution" (Bourdieu 
1995). Looking outward, the development of Western-style laws suggests 
Taiwan's ability to conform with Western notions of modernity, and thus holds 
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out a promise of international recognition This symbolic importance of legal 
strictures often outstrips the practical weight given their enforcement. Legality 
thus plays an important role in the city's self-presentation. 
 Ms. Zhu, a high-ranking department administrator who had played a part 
in the development of Taipei’s zoning ordinances, demonstrated this differential 
importance. Taipei’s first zoning laws were passed under the Japanese colonial 
regime (Huang 1983; Zhang 1993; Huang 1998; Allen 2000, 2005). A 1936 law 
introduced standardized land-use zoning to Taiwan, dividing the city into 
functional areas distinguished by 'positive' and 'negative' zoning requirements. 
Negative zoning regulations divided the city into 'regions' (diyu 地域) with limits 
on potential use, setting off residential, commercial, and industrial areas, areas 
with light industry and land held in reserve in anticipation of city expansion, and 
areas not to be developed, like parks (Huang 1998:112). Positive zoning 
regulations, which set apart 'areas' or 'districts' (diqu 地區), specified the range of 
allowable uses, setting up scenic, natural, fire-prevention, and sex-work areas 
(Zhang 1993). In the late 1970s--that is, as U.S. and U.N. recognition were 
moving away from Taiwan and toward the P.R.C.--the city government convened 
a group of experts and scholars to reformulate and update the zoning laws. The 
group, led by professors Taipei University (臺北大學, then called Zhongxing 
University 中興大學), worked on developing new zoning regulations with more 
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positive—prescriptive rather than proscriptive—parameters. They finished their 
work in 1983 with the promulgation of the city’s new zoning regulations. Their 
main frame of reference was the zoning system of New York City.  
 Ms. Zhu commented that city administrators generally would like to move 
Taiwan in the direction of Japan or Euro-America (Oumei 歐美) by for instance,  
enforcing regulations limiting commercial establishments to the first floors of 
streetfront buildings. But, she explained, the fact was that Taiwan’s society 
differed greatly from that of New York City, where the ideas for these regulations 
had come from. Taiwanese people, for instance, were accustomed to commercial 
establishments occupying any given story of any given building, not only on the 
streetfront but in the small alleys as well. What’s more, Ms. Zhu continued, 
Taiwanese people are generally happy with this situation. With a store or a 
restaurant on the floor above a residence, as she put it, “we are likely to feel not 
that it is a nuisance, but that it is a convenience.”xiv So although in principle 
administrators would like to move the city toward stricter zoning divisions, at 
present they didn’t have the capability to separate residence and commerce very 
clearly. Indeed, the entire city was effectively a mixed use area. In other words, 
and perhaps not so surprisingly, although the laws were drawn from New York 
City, the society they applied to had remained that of Taipei.xv 
 Ms. Zhu, who had worked on formulating and promulgating the zoning 
regulations, did not seem disturbed by the unenforceable quality of the laws she 
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had helped create. Taking me step by step through the history of the zoning laws, 
she used the same patient, explanatory tone of voice to discuss both the 
regulations and the fact that they were not enforceable. In her depiction, these two 
aspects of the story did not appear as contradictions, nor did the latter seem to 
invalidate the former. For Ms. Zhu, the existence of regulations appeared to 
function as an indication of a larger, almost metaphysical, trend: a symbol of 
progress in a Euro-American direction, rather than a social force she expected to 
actually regulate people’s activities. In conversation with this senior administrator, 
legality played a limited role. It was a kind of emblem indicating that the 
government recognized the expectations of an international community whose 
continued approval seems to be essential to Taiwan’s ability to act as a practically, 
if not legally, sovereign nation (Rigger 2000). At this level, where law works as a 
message to international addressees, the role of law was thus not necessarily to 
enforce a particular vision of society, but to present it to outside observers.  
 This emphasis on self-presentation and self-definition through relation to 
more powerful external entities may be typical of the political process of many 
places economically, politically, or culturally marginalized places (Gal 1991). It 
also makes sense given the precarious juridical and military position of Taiwan in 
a community of nation-states that don’t quite know what to make of it. In the 
midst of protests over the presidential election of 2004, for instance, which Chen 
Shui-bian won by a disputed fraction of a percentage point, the mainland Chinese 
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government announced that it would consider sending its military to restore order 
to the island--that is, to use Taiwan’s domestic turmoil as a chance to invade and 
occupy it. The situation in Taiwan itself looked to many observers strangely 
similar to that of the United States in 2000; the international reaction, however, 
did not. Little wonder, then, that local administrative action is often colored by 
cross-Straits relations and international expectations. Little wonder that 
government administrators work to carve out a recognizably unique place for 
Taiwan, summarized by Mr. Can’s injunction to find or define Taipei’s sense of 
self.  
 
5. LEGALITY AMONG ADMINISTRATORS 
 Positive zoning regulations, like those developed by Ms. Zhu's group, 
have epistemological implications. Under the Japanese system, positive zoning 
regulations set off a limited number of urban areas for a highly limited number of 
specific uses. Most of the city was covered by negative regulations, which 
restricted disallowed uses. Extending positive regulations to larger areas of the 
city, however, required an encompassing understanding of urban society: to 
specify all allowable land uses in their regulations, administrators had to be able 
to imagine what those various land uses might be. At the same time, rapid 
changes in Taiwan’s society and political organization--the lack of consensus 
described by Mr. Wei above--have led administrators to despair of knowing much 
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at all. Taiwanese society, many agreed, had become too "complicated (fuza 複
雜)" to track with administrative knowledge. The encompassing intent of 
regulation required cumbersome legal changes to accommodate new practices and 
social phenomena. Administrators described this as a 'hard, unyielding (ying 硬)' 
quality. This hardness left administrators playing catch-up with a rapidly 
changing society and rendered legality unusable in many administrative situations.  
 Even as administrators spoke of the written law as inflexibly attempting to 
define everything under its purview, they described even the procedures of 
legality as a field of compromise and uncertainty. Commenting on the chronology 
of legal implementation, for instance, Ms. Gu, a mid-level administrator, 
emphasized not the bureaucracy's ability to clearly differentiate legal from illegal 
behavior, but the opportunities for negotiation that even law on the books offered. 
Many laws having to do with land use, for instance, are put into implementational 
abeyance when they are passed. Implementation is suspended pending the 
development of associated laws and measures (peitao cuoshi 配套措施) seen as 
their necessary complements. Announcing a law, the government thus effectively 
announces only its intention to make a set of interrelated laws. This leads to a 
certain amount of systemic confusion about the relationship among the 
announcement of the original law, the development of associated laws and 
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measures, and the built-in grace periods for implementation--differences, often, of 
years or decades.  
 Ms. Gu pointed to the uncertainties of the law, emphasizing the gaps or 
discrepancies (luocha 落差) in legal procedure. These gaps were not gaps 
between law on the books and law in action, but gaps within law on the books 
itself. As my coworkers' constant negotiations with city residents demonstrated, 
the very inflexibility of these legal strictures left capacious room for argument. 
Theories of bureaucratic functioning often emphasize the role of the bureaucracy 
in categorizing and defining the objects under its purview (cf. Handelman 2004). 
The administrators I worked with, in contrast, emphasized the structural 
impossibility of clear-cut categorization.  
 A prevailing notion that laws ought to be able to achieve the kind of 
encompassing and predictive capabilities needed to specify something like all 
allowable uses of a piece of land thus coexists with a prevailing conviction that 
they cannot do so. Administrators involved in creating such laws were, in a sense, 
confounded by their own perfectionism, as the preferred form of law insisted on a 
totalizing knowledge that led administrators to feel that they could achieve no 
knowledge at all. Even outside the arena of international addressees, thus, legality 
often functioned more as an emblem of the state's desired knowledge capacity 
than as an acknowledged or legitimated social force.  
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 Administrators usually talked about their roles and goals in terms of 
negotiation and ambiguity, rather than in terms of clear-cut distinctions among 
straightforward categories of political organization. The duties, ends, and means 
of technocratic administration were live issues for the bureaucrats I worked with, 
who constantly redefined their positions within the complex and never fully 
definable organizations they inhabited. Indeed, invoking a schema of simply 
defined political categories that would render finalized or cut-and-dried (in 
Mandarin, dry-and-crispy, gancui 乾脆) decisions could arouse the suspicion of 
other administrators.   
 For instance, during my time at the city government, planners working for 
a public university in Taipei submitted a proposal to expand its facilities by 
constructing a new highrise building on its campus. The highrise was to be placed 
around a Japanese-era building that would be dismantled and moved temporarily 
during construction. The Japanese-era building would then be replaced in its 
original location, but now behind glass, inside the highrise itself. The proposal 
had been accepted, then suddenly reviewed and rejected as the Heritage Site and 
Historical Relics Evaluation Committee (Guji ji Lishijianzhu Shencha Weiyuanhui 
古蹟暨歷史建築審查委員會) designated the Japanese-era building a heritage 
site. The designation restricted the university’s right to dismantle, move, rebuild, 
or tear down the building. The head of one relevant city government department, 
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in which the independent Heritage Committee was housed, chaired an 
acrimonious meeting with university representatives.  
 When the representatives appealed to the department head to give them 
room to pursue alternatives, he rejected their request in a rising voice: the decision 
had been taken by the Evaluation Committee, he insisted, and he could not direct 
(zhudao 主導) them. If he held that power, Taiwan would a society of rule-by-
person (renzhi shehui 人治社會), rather than a society of rule-by-law (fazhi 
shehui 法治社會). As the meeting went on, a university representative 
encouraged the department head to compromise, appealing to their similar status: 
“We’re all government employees (women doushi gongwuyuan 我們都是公務
員).” The department head flatly rejected this appeal to personal status and 
relations: “I am not the kind of government employee you’re talking about. 
'We’re all government employees'—what do you mean by that?”xvi The meeting 
continued with more acrimonious exchanges and little progress. 
 Renzhi and fazhi, rule-by-person and rule-by-law, are old terms in Chinese 
political philosophy (Chen 1999; Keller 1994). In Taiwan they sometimes 
contrast the martial law era with the new democratic one. In the former, political 
power was held by individuals who were to varying extents above the laws, while 
under democracy, individuals implement laws that are above them. As my 
discussion shows, though, these terms are not as straightforward as this initial 
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description suggests. For instance, Shuquan, a Department of Urban Development 
administrator who attended this meeting, appeared unmoved by the department 
head’s appeals to the rule of law. A long-term administrator generally admired by 
colleagues for his professional skills and deep understanding of urban design, 
Shuquan commented that the university’s plan took the old building into account, 
treating it very respectfully (hen zunzhongde duidai 很尊重的對待). But beyond 
differences of opinion about urban design, Shuquan mistrusted the department 
head's invocations of legality as legitimation.  
 Every relevant department, Shuquan explained, had deliberated (shenyi 審
議) over this case (anzi 案子) and approved it. The work was about get started 
when someone, a scholar with a certain status—Shuquan carefully noted that he 
was not telling me who it was—demanded that the city government protect this 
building as a heritage site. We don’t know what this person’s real motivation was, 
Shuquan continued, but it was clear that if this building were declared a heritage 
site, the whole plan would have to be scrapped and the university would lose the 
government subsidy to improve its campus, since such subsidies are given for 
specific projects at specific locations.  
 Moreover, the president of this public university was coming up for 
reappointment by the central government committee in charge of public education, 
and losing this subsidy would jeopardize his chances. Shuquan diplomatically 
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emphasized that he don’t know the complainant’s real motivation; but he did 
know that the complainant was a scholar at another university. Administrators 
assigned to the project had not raised this issue when they’d deliberated over the 
plan in the first place; but when a well-known scholar complained, they suddenly 
became very active (jiji 積極).  “I’m pretty sure," Shuquan commented with 
exasperated sarcasm, "that if I as an ordinary citizen write a letter today to say 
some building should be preserved, they definitely wouldn’t pay attention to me; 
they’d think I was a madman.”xvii  
 All this aroused his indignation at the department head’s clear distinction 
of rule-by-man from rule-by-law and by his insistence that he was powerless to 
affect the heritage designation decision. “What’s that supposed to mean?" 
Shuquan scoffed. "A department head doesn’t have the right (power) to get things 
done—what does that mean? Anyway if he doesn’t have the right (power), then 
who does?”xviii For Shuquan, the department head’s invocation of clear-cut 
political distinctions was disingenuous. To claim that someone in his position 
lacked the power he claimed to lack was laughably false, and his claim to this 
effect transparently utilitarian. The ideal of rule-by-law, Shuquan’s response 
suggested, is something invoked by people to justify their own rule-by-person 
conduct. Moreover, the idea of removing a high-level administrator from a sphere 
of administration relevant to his department did not, for Shuquan, suggest a 
salutary democratic separation of powers. Rather, it suggested a power vacuum.  
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 In contrast to this brittle and misleading quality of the law, administrators 
spoke of themselves as tied through bonds of emotion. Speaking at the end of the 
regional planning meeting described above, the representative from the nearby 
city of Keelung (Jilong 基隆) summed up his position. “When I first met [Mr. Ke, 
the Taipei administrator promoting regional cooperation],” he said, “I said to him: 
it takes twenty minutes to get from Taipei to Keelung by car, but in terms of 
feelings, it’s very far away. Now that we’ve gotten connected emotionally 
(lianluo ganqing 聯絡感情), well, it feels very close.”xix The phrase lianluo 
ganqing, which combines a word for ‘communicate, contact’ with a term for 
‘emotion,’ was often used in these situations to mean ‘to get closer’ or ‘become 
friendly.’ To lianluo ganqing was often the explicitly stated aim of convening 
meetings, especially those that brought together administrators from different 
areas of the bureaucracy. This emphasis on emotional congruence came to the 
fore often as administrators found ways around the systemic difficulties of 
administrative functioning through personal relationships and affective 
attachments. Indeed, wide, dense social networks and the ability to get along with 
people were explicitly acknowledged as being invaluable to bureaucratic work. 
This fact was for the most part not presented as a failing of an insufficiently 
rational bureaucratic system but rather as a sign that bureaucrats conformed to 
widely held ethical and social norms that favored ongoing relations of mutual aid 
over objective, standardized processes.  
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 For administrators dealing with other administrators, then, the law often 
provided as a cover for unethical or unreasonable behavior. Insisting on a strict 
application of the law could raise or reinforce suspicions about an administrator's 
actions, rather than legitimate them. Administrators found the written law itself 
similarly ambiguous and untrustworthy. Far from lending certainty to 
administrative actions, the structure of urban planning laws was seen to confound 
predictability. Ideas of legality inherited from the colonial and postcolonial eras 
left administrators regulating a society that appeared chaotic and unknowable 
when judged by reference to an ideal, unrealistically perfect, legal structure.  
 
6. ADMINISTRATION AS SOCIAL ACTOR 
 Democratization altered the way that the Taipei city government 
bureaucracy interacted with the people under its administrative purview.  This 
historic process had put administrators under new, competing pressures. In the 
English-language literature, the important transformation of the 1980s and ‘90s in 
Taiwan is typically described as the end of martial law, a transition from 
dictatorship to democracy that hit full force when the suspension of the 
constitution ended in 1986-87, with aftershocks in 1996 (first popular presidential 
election) and 2000 (first inter-party handover of presidential power).  
 This periodization was, however, almost never used by my Taiwanese 
interlocutors. Outside the government, almost nobody I knew remembered the 
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dates of such supposedly key events as the lifting of martial law. In the informal 
historiography of everyday reference, the entire martial law period often appeared 
tinted in one consistent hue—a charcoal grey stability, a bullfight red 
repression—lent by the speaker’s political position. This suggests that most 
people in most cases found the general tenor of a time period more relevant to 
their lives, and more memorable, than point-like events such as the transition from 
martial law to constitution or from appointed to elected government. Some point-
like events did however work as a viable synecdoche for political change when 
the speakers were people affected by them in narrow and specific ways, like those 
who worked in the city government. 
 The widely acknowledged political watershed in City Hall was, 
accordingly, not the end of martial law or democratization in general but 
specifically the changed status of the mayor. In 1967, after a non-KMT mayor 
won election for a second term, Taipei had been redesignated a provincially 
administered city, its mayors appointed by the central government (Rigger 1999, 
2001). Elections were reinstated in 1994. The standard Mandarin word for 
election, xuanju 選舉, combines the characters ‘to choose’ and ‘to recommend’ 
(also used in terms for ‘to organize’). But administrators usually referred to the 
relevant point-like event not as xuanju, ‘election,’ but as the transition to a ‘mayor 
chosen (or elected) by the people (shizhang minxuan 市長民選)’ or just ‘choice 
(or election) by the people (minxuan 民選).’ 
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 Elected mayors were credited by administrators with changing the tenor of 
the bureaucracy and putting government in closer touch with citizens’ needs. But 
elections themselves were not seen to inherently promote either the efficient or 
the standardized application of laws and policies. Before the 1990s, government 
budgets were planned in secret with little input from the legislatures (Tan 2000). 
Democratization had brought a sharp decline in administrative autonomy from 
elected bodies, and the Taipei City Council now decides on the government’s 
budgets. Administrators are painfully aware of city councilors’ control over their 
ability to implement projects, and city councilors have considerable influence 
with individual administrators—especially the lower-level bureaucrats typically in 
charge of street-level order-keeping, who worry about making trouble for their 
department head. 
 In Taiwan’s rather complicated electoral system (single, nontransferable 
votes in multi-member districts, described in detail by Rigger 1999) and highly 
social electoral culture (Lerman 1978), City Council members are closely tied to 
individual constituents through both their own unending social activity and the 
efforts of their vote-gatherers or ward captains (“support posts,” bangzhuang 幫
樁 in Mandarin, thiau-ah kha in Minnanese).xx Elected representatives are 
expected to offer all kinds of help to their constituents, including not only policies 
that benefit the locality or constituents’ major business interests, but also various 
kinds of highly personalized pork: representatives are expected to find people 
 36 
jobs, to lend them money, to try to get their children into good schools and their 
parents into good hospitals. Of course, one way that elected representatives can 
show their appreciation for constituents is to help them get around regulatory 
restrictions by, for instance, putting pressure on administrators in the Department 
of Urban Development not to cite a constituent’s illegal structure, or convincing 
people in the Department of Public Works not to tear it down.  
 Administrators generally talked about the Taipei City Council, an elected 
body, as a glitch in the progress of technocracy. People in the bureaucracy usually 
treated personal corruption on the part of other administrators as a localized 
personality trait rather than a systemic factor. In contrast, one of the major 
ongoing obstacles administrators cited to implementing regulations was guanshuo 
關說, or informal lobbying by members of the city council—the directly elected 
representatives of the people—on behalf of their constituents.xxi Many 
administrators complained about continual pressure to bend the rules for just one 
more voter.  
Popular elections also had a different set of important consequences for 
administrators: they rendered departmental priorities unstable and long-term 
planning impossible. There had only been two elected mayors in Taipei during the 
time of my fieldwork: Chen Shui-bian (1994-1998) and Ma Ying-jeou (1998-
2006).xxii But administrators assumed that an incoming elected official would run 
his bureaucracy like a fiefdom: a new mayor was expected to scrap plans made by 
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a predecessor, including those designed and funded for implementation over a 
number of years. Almost twenty years after the disaggregation of party from state, 
there were still a kind of one-to-one correlation between them—albeit now one 
that worked on a four-year election cycle. The fact that the one-to-one 
correspondence of party to state could now periodically involve new and different 
parties only made government process less predictable (cf. Tan 2000). Thus the 
very process that is often seen to legitimate legal strictures in a democracy—the 
popular election of representatives to legislate and to execute legislation—was 
also a source of partiality and unpredictability that obstructed administrators’ 
attempts at regulation.  
Elections, in sum, led to inevitable instability. For the administrator, this 
translated into uncertainty and frustration, the demise of long-term vision, and the 
cluttering of professional craft with work that was done just for show. Elections 
pitted the bureaucratic administration against the elected legislature in ways that 
could leave technocrats powerless to enforce regulations because the personalistic 
influence of individual constituents was built into the system through the practice 
of voting. At the same time, elections subjected administrators and the city 
government as an institution to a new, and in a sense opposed, kind of pressure: 
the need to legitimate themselves and justify their actions in the eyes of a 
sometimes suspicious, and increasingly demanding, electorate. The pressure of 
these demands was gently remarked on in a meeting where an elderly community 
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activist admonished a group of administrators to be a little more liberal with their 
spending on cultural preservation: “Cultural things just do require spending 
money.” A high-level DUD employee agreed but qualified: “But when you spend 
money you want to spend it so that people praise you, not so they scold you.”xxiii  
 Rather than enforcing or invoking clearly stipulated and straightforwardly 
implementable laws, department administrators spent much of their time talking 
to people. Administrators were constantly preparing for and holding meetings 
with residents of localities under their purview. One of the most common types 
was the ‘explanatory meeting (shuominghui 說明會),’ a name that harks back to 
an era when government administrators were more free to simply ‘explain’ their 
plans to the affected people. These days, shuominghui are more likely to be about 
reaching a compromise than sharing information.  
 For instance, Maokong (貓空) is a mountainous tea-growing area of 
Taipei zoned as farmland (nongye qu 農業區), which entails heavy restrictions on 
commercial activity. Nonetheless, Maokong has, for a couple of decades now, 
been one of Taipei’s main leisure consumption areas: the mountains are crowded 
with teahouses and restaurants and the slim roads are chronically jammed on 
weekends and holidays. DUD administrators had been working for several years 
to bring the Maokong area under some sort of regulatory control. Local 
landowners pushed to retain their agricultural designation, which left their 
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property taxes untouched and their activities largely unregulated, but they also 
agitated to receive improved public facilities. DUD administrators, in turn, felt 
they needed to bring some order to hillside water usage and construction before 
the pressure of so many busy establishments on the steeply sloped hills led to an 
environmental disaster.  
 The process of legalization was generally not described in terms of laws. 
As one administrator explained, persuasiveness (shuifuli 說服力) would 
determine the situation's resolution. The process hinged on negotiating and 
speaking skills—what’s known as 'mouth-talent (koucai 口才).' An administrator 
in charge of a similar legalization process in another area expressed a typical 
sentiment when he said that the teahouses on Maokong arose and endure because 
they answer a demand (xuqiu 需求). The fact that their actual land use failed to 
correspond to their zoning designation was really the government’s fault. Moving 
“too slowly,” it had been overtaken by “social changes (shehui de bianqian 社會
的變遷)” like the increasing demand for leisure activities by Taipei’s increasingly 
wealthy population. Negotiating and compromising with the business owners in 
order to legalize these businesses, he explained, was the government’s duty or 
responsibility (zeren 責任). 
 A large meeting with landowners from Maokong started out with an 
attempt to connect the participants emotionally through the medium of food, an 
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indispensable part of almost any Taiwanese social interaction. The participants 
joined in a multi-course lunchtime banquet, after which the DUD section head in 
charge of the case hopped up on stage and took the microphone. Engaging in 
public negotiation with the several hundred local landowners who faced him, he 
answered questions even as he issued pleas and offered promises. As landowners 
came up to ask questions, express opinions, and occasionally berate him and his 
administrative system, the section head outlined not the clear boundaries of 
legality or the unilateral demands of governance but a shifting ground of 
compromise. “The best way is for us all to retreat (step back)," he said. 
"Landowners (farmers) retreat a step, and the city government retreats a step.”xxiv 
People involved in planning negotiations in Taipei sometimes complained about 
the slow pace of government action. But part of the background for this pace was 
precisely the constant negotiations, mutual accommodation, and synchronized 
retreat that the section head's plea outlined. 
 Even seemingly straightforward implementations of regulation turned out 
to position the city government principally not within a web of laws but as part of 
a network of interdependent social actors. Though city government departments 
concerned with spatial management can be quite proactive, their regulatory 
enforcement tends to be reactive: it usually takes a complaint, or several, to make 
them swing into action. Given the likelihood of the kind of interference from 
elected officials mentioned above and the general bother of tearing things down 
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and incurring the anger of the people who built them, even a complaint that was 
not intercepted by some sort of pressure was always likely to be simply shelved.  
This option becomes more complicates when people lodge their 
complaints via the internet, however. Internet complaints can be tracked by their 
(importantly, anonymous) lodgers. Faced with this new situation, an administrator 
told me, the department in charge of tearing down illegal structures had instituted 
a new, unofficial but standard, response procedure. After ascertaining the veracity 
of a complaint, an administrator would contact the offending parties and advise 
them to figure out which of their neighbors they had offended. If someone was 
going so far as to complain to the city government, the reasoning went, the 
offending parties clearly were not managing their social relations very well. A 
warning from a neutral source might give them a chance to ameliorate the 
situation, defusing the problem and letting the department off the hook.  
If another complaint was filed, though, “there’s nothing we can do (mei 
banfa 沒辦法).” The department would then tear the thing down, if only to avoid 
the risk of itself becoming the target of resident complaints.xxv While these steps 
might appear to increase legal standardization, they were phrased and justified in 
the ethical terminology of interpersonal relations. A direct, anonymous complaint 
to the city government signaled a breakdown of the ethical norms of interpersonal 
relations among the parties involved. The bureaucracy’s primary job was to act as 
a broker in this interpersonal arena, assisting with the reestablishment of normal 
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relations. Its subsequent taking on of an assertively regulatory role was explained 
in terms of its interpersonal (so to speak) relations with complainants: the 
bureaucracy, too, had a social role to play.  
When addressing those outside the bureaucracy, thus, administrators often 
resorted to nonlegal justifications for their attempts to implement legal strictures. 
In some situations, as with the internet complaints, the law pushed administrators 
to play an ameliorative, consensus-building social role. Implementing zoning 
regulations by actually tearing down illegal structures was also an admission of 
failure in fulfilling this social role. Administrators assumed that they must cajole 
and convince people outside the government to agree to come within their 
regulative scope. Their negotiations with outsiders largely figured the government 
not as wielding the might of legitimated control but as vying for legitimation from 
outsiders. While the personalistic ethos of the regime patronage system still 
permeated administrative actions, administrators were now likely to perceive 
themselves not as patrons but as clients of their constituents. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 As I have detailed above, administrative conceptions of law in Taiwan 
tend to differ by object or addressee. At the level of international organization, 
law is figured as an emblem that need bear little relation with actual situations on 
the ground. The existence of a western-style legal and regulatory system functions 
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as a kind of symbol of modernity and of Taiwan’s right to take a place in the 
community of nation-states. At the level of inter-administrator interaction, the law 
is often perceived as too inflexible to yield realistic results and too manipulable to 
provided a trustworthy justification for action. In interactions between 
administrators and others outside the bureaucracy, law appears sometimes as an 
impetus to correct social action, sometimes as a boundary that exposes 
administrative failure. Often, as administrators plead with people to come into the 
regulative fold, law barely makes an appearance at all.  
 Administrators often see law as too hard or inflexible to be well suited to 
regulating actual social life. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, this very 
inflexibility helps render legality a field of negotiation. The people I worked with 
regarded both the written law and law in action as aspects of the sociopolitical 
process of compromise that typified government action, rather than as a 
superordinate or rationalized repository of general values. Attempts to implement 
the kind of election-based representativeness or legally regulated transparency 
required by common notions of the rule of law sometimes obstruct the 
implementation of regulations. And reaching consensus—rather than delineating 
rights and responsibilities or forging contractual obligations—is the stated goal of 
most of the acrimonious government-based meetings I saw. The administrators I 
knew were more likely to draw their models for understanding and behaving in 
the world from an ethical realm that privileged the maintenance of correct 
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relationships with others, the fulfillment of interpersonal responsibilities, and the 
striving for consensus, rather than a legalistic conception of justice as impartial 
equality. Indeed, the law itself often needed support from other realms for 
justification.  
 It may be that the discourse of law—derived in Taiwan as in many places 
from Euro-American models—is often seen to attempt to encompass all human 
action and to permeate people’s conceptions of their own actions. But as I’ve 
described, in Taipei even the people delegated to implement the law find the very 
legitimacy of the law questionable. They answer this question differently in 
different situations—differences that can best be understood not by looking for an 
overarching, consistent notion of legality but by following their own 
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i The island has been multiply and complexly colonized, starting with the Dutch 
East India Company's brief rule over the south (1642-1662), when the first 
significant numbers of agricultural migrants from southeastern China came across 
the Taiwan Strait to turn Taiwan into the primary sugar exporter of the Dutch 
colonies (Ka 1995:13). The Dutch were expelled by Koxinga, a  Chinese-
Japanese pirate-crusader, and his descendants, who used the island as a base from 
which to launch attacks on the newly incumbent Qing dynasty on the mainland 
until the Qing itself took over Taiwan in 1683. In 1895, the Qing surrendered 
Taiwan to the Japanese; the legacy of their bureaucratic organization of their first 
colony would be as important as their early moves toward its industrialization. 
After the Japanese defeat in World War II, the victorious Allies transferred 
control of Taiwan to the KMT (the Chinese Nationalist Party), the internationally 
recognized authority on the mainland, which was then engaged in the endgame of 
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the Chinese civil war. With the Communist victory on the mainland in 1949, the 
KMT retreated to Taiwan, declaring itself the legitimate government of China in 
exile and holding the island under martial law until 1986. Post-martial law 
political rhetoric sometimes refers to the KMT as another 'foreign power (wailai 
zhengquan 外來政權)' (see e.g. Ye Qizheng 葉啟政 et al. 2000) implying a semi-
colonizing status (Phillips 2003 describes early interactions between the KMT and 
the sociopolitical forces it found on the island).  
ii DPP stands for Democratic Progressive Party, the initial opposition party 
formed in 1986, slightly in advance of the lifting of martial law restrictions on 
political party formation, by members of the opposition movement known until 
then as Dangwai (黨外), or "Outside the Party." KMT stands for Kuomintang 
(Guomindang 國民黨), whose English name is the Chinese Nationalist Party. To 
avoid confusion among different kinds of Chineseness and different kinds of 
nationalism, I use the transliterated acronym KMT. 
iii The primary ethnicized divisions in Taiwan distinguish those who migrated to 
the island after its return to Chinese rule in 1945 from those whose ancestors had 
moved there over the course of the preceding three centuries. These two groups, 
while differentiated on the island by the term zuqun (族群, group or ethnicity), are 
generally acknowledged to belong to the same race (minzu, 民族). The roughly 
2% of the island's population descended from indigenous inhabitants, in contrast, 
is spoken of as separate from this common ancestry; but this is not the main 
ethnicized distinction in Taiwanese politics.  
iv “...we should direct our researches on the nature of power not towards the 
juridical edifice of sovereignty, the State apparatuses and the ideologies which 
accompany them, but towards domination and the material operators of power, 
towards forms of subjection and the inflections and utilizations of their localized 
systems, and towards strategic apparatuses. We must eschew the model of 
Leviathan in the study of power. We must escape from the limited field of 
juridical sovereignty and State institutions, and instead base our analysis of power 
on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination” (Foucault 1980:102). 
v As Peter Blau (1963:276) suggests, people who study bureaucracy are likely to 
end up in relatively open and flexible parts of it. “Suppose someone wants to 
study bureaucratic rigidities and fear of innovation. The very fact that 
management gives him permission to conduct his investigation in the organization 
indicates that it is not resistant to trying something new." This is certainly true of 
the Department of Urban Development, were administrators at all levels of the 
department hierarchy acted welcoming of my presence and willing to entertain 
my questions. 
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vi "Probably none of us would be willing the bear the costs of 100% enforcement 
of all the laws all the time. On the one hand, we rely on police and prosecutorial 
discretion to tailor the law to fit real situations not anticipated by the legislature. 
... On the other hand, full enforcement would entail many costs ... [to] privacy and 
civil liberties" (2005:390).  
vii This view is shared by other theorists of the political, notably Carl Schmitt 
(1985a; 1985b; 2004; see also McCormick 1997) and perhaps Weber (though see 
du Gay 2000 for an alternative interpretation of Weber’s moral evaluation of 
bureaucracy). It may be worth noting that these persuasive critics of 
administrative governance come from overlapping places and times. 
viiiHonig (1993:82) suggests something similar: Arendt’s categories of action may 
be defined less by a sphere of activity than by a “mentality… characteristic of” 
certain kinds of activities.  
ix All names in this article are pseudonyms. Naming conventions reflect my own 
relations to the people involved: superiors, whom I addressed by family name and 
departmental position, are presented here by family name preceded by Mr. or Ms., 
while those of equal rank, whom I addressed by given names or family name and 
given name, are presented here as such as well.  
x “我們最喜歡抄你們的, 因為最熟… 他們本來抄歐洲的, 那我們因為很近所
以就抄他們的.” 
xiWu finds that martial law era Taiwan had a bifurcated elite structure in which 
national (or Party) level elites were separated from local-level political elites (or 
factions) both demographically (the former were predominantly mainlanders, the 
latter Minnanese) and in terms of recruitment to the system (the former through 
kinship and acquaintance in the Party, the later through local social networks), 
and that local elites almost never made it into the ranks of national elites. 
xii Shelley Rigger (2000) rightly points out the "post-nationalist" stance of many 
Taiwanese people, who care more about "autonomy" (possessing and controlling 
a separate state and economy) than formal "sovereignty" (the de jure recognition 
of that separation). As she details, this helps explain why for the majority of 
Taiwanese, the “answer to the question ‘Do you prefer independence or 
unification?’ is ‘no’” (Rigger 2000:152-153). Formal sovereignty and unification 
are, as Rigger suggests, much more important as handy extreme poles for political 
discourse than as actual political preferences. Still, city administrators, perhaps 
more than most people, took both actual autonomy and potential sovereignty into 
account. 
xiii “我們沒有共識… 連討論臺北應該怎麼樣討論不下去. 臺北是不是首都? 它
當然是首都. 你敢不敢講這是首都? 不敢講…. 連一個在山坡地我們要不要個
斜屋頂 … 連這個都沒辦法有共識. 也是爭了好幾年” (Interview with Mr. Wei, 
Department of Urban Development administrator, 11\05\03). 
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xiv Interview with Ms. Zhu, Department of Urban Development administrator, 
09\09\04. 
xv This is not to say the laws have not had any effect at all. Although they have 
not successfully determined actual land uses of existing buildings, zoning 
regulations have helped the city government control the size of newly constructed 
buildings, whose footprint-to-area ratio is partly determined by the zoning of the 
land plot. (New construction is, of course, much easier to track than the use of 
particular rooms in existing buildings.) The regulations have also given rise to 
constant landlord petitions to designate their area a commercial zone, which 
predictably increases the value of the land in Taipei’s agile and speculation-prone 
real estate market. According to other sources, such as a friend who opened a 
business in a residential area, another effect of zoning regulations has been to 
provide local police officers, who are the most likely to be aware of land-use 
violations on their beats, with an opportunity to increase their informal profits by 
promising to neglect to report a violation. In practice it seemed that such bribes 
were usually asked only of highly restricted businesses on the edge of legality to 
begin with, such as hostess bars, video game gambling parlors, and the like, 
whose owners often paid the local organized crime unit as well.  
xvi “你不要暗示社麼，你要說明白. 我不是你說的那種公務員. 《我們都是公
務員》，你是甚麼意思呢?” 
xvii “我相信我這個市民小老百姓今天寫信來說, 某個房子要保護, 他一定不理
我, 他以為我是瘋子.” 
xviii “怎麼可能? 局長沒有權利做事怎麼可能? 再說他沒有權利誰有權利呢?” 
The first question, repeated later, means “how is that possible?” But colloquial 
usage (and the typical tone of voice used with it) places it closer to something 
coarser in English. 
xix “跟[咳先生]第一次接觸跟他講, 臺北到基隆車上二十分鐘可是感覺上很遠
的. 那現在聯絡感情就覺得很近.”  
xx What I call Minnanese here is the local language or dialect on Taiwan, usually 
known as Taiwanese (Taiwanhua 臺彎話, Taiyu 台語) or Southern Min 
(Minnanyu 閩南語), which coexists with the official language of Mandarin, 
which is known in Taiwan as “the national language (Guoyu 國語).” I use the 
term Minnanese as a way of trying to sidestep the implications that the other 
terms can be seen to have about the speaker’s opinion on the relationship between 
Taiwan and the PRC. Thanks to Cheng-Yi Huang 黃承儀 for this suggestion. 
xxiNo laws acknowledge or regulate formal lobbying in Taiwan (Tan 2000). Some 
administrators compared this situation unfavorably to that of the U.S., where, they 
felt, explicit legal recognition of lobbying made it easier to perhaps to control. 
This judgment no doubt had to do with the common image of the US as a largely 
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law-abiding and, as one administrator put it, relatively simple or innocent 
(danchun 單純) society. 
xxii Hau Lung-bin (Hao Longbin 郝龍斌), a KMT candidate, was elected mayor in 
December 2006.  
xxiii“ 文化的東西本來要花錢 ;” “花錢要花得讓人家成長而不是被人家罵.” 
xxiv “…siong ho e banhua si nng e long 退步, 農民退一步, 市政府也退一步” 
(the romanized part is in Minnanese).   
xxvJeffrey Martin (2007) describes a similar but more complex situation outside of 
the capital city, where a police officer responsible for fining an unlicensed food 
stand manipulates evidence in order to avoid disrupting the status quo of busy 
market life. The impulse Martin describes, however, is similar: the police officer 
mediates between offender and complainer, encouraging them to come to an 
understanding. The force of the law is less what the police officer imposes on 
them than it is an impetus for him to encourage this reconciliation. Matthew Hull 
(2003) explains why administrators might be resistant to the incursion into their 
areas of knowledge and control that the internet represents, but I did not see such 
resistance myself.  
